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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5926
This paper empirically investigates whether households 
affected by income shocks cope by reducing human 
capital investments. The analysis uses Crisis Response 
Surveys conducted in Armenia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, 
Romania, and Turkey during 2009 and 2010. A 
propensity score matching technique is adopted to 
compare health and education investment decisions 
among households that were affected by income shocks 
to the matched comparison group. The authors find that 
households affected by income shocks reduced some 
human capital investments. Interestingly, households 
in these five countries were more likely to adopt health-
related coping strategies as opposed to education-related 
coping strategies. The results from Armenia, Bulgaria, 
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Montenegro, and Turkey show that households affected 
by income shocks reduced their visits to doctors and 
reduced their spending on medicine and medical care 
significantly more than the matched comparison group. 
Households affected by income shocks reduced their 
education investments, but did not adopt harmful 
education-related coping strategies, such as withdrawing 
children from schools or moving children from costly 
private to cheaper public schools. These findings reveal 
that long-term and possibly intergenerational household 
welfare could be affected by short-run income shocks and 
hence underscore the need for governments to employ 
mitigation measures. <okay – sg> 
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1 Introduction  
In the wake of the recent Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), the impact of adverse events on 
families has gained renewed focus among policy makers and academics. However, adverse events 
are not always caused by aggregate shocks, which generally emanate from economic recessions, 
natural disasters, etc.; they could also be caused by idiosyncratic shocks, such as a death in the 
family, job loss, etc. Irrespective of the source of the shock, families adopt coping strategies to 
mitigate the impacts of these adverse events. These coping strategies generally consist of drawing 
on savings, increasing family labor supply (inserting non-working family members into the labor 
market or increasing the number of hours worked), accessing formal (government supported social 
assistance) or informal (remittances, charities, nongovernmental organizations, borrowing) safety 
nets, and reducing household expenditures (durable goods, food, clothing, etc.) and investments 
(human, financial etc.).  
This paper studies whether households affected by income shocks cope by reducing human 
capital investments. We focus on coping strategies in human capital investments because of their 
potential longer term or intergenerational impact on household welfare. The paper exploits five 
unique Crisis Response Surveys (CRS) conducted in Armenia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania, 
and Turkey during 2009 and 2010.
2 
The timing of the surveys coincided with the effects of the 
recent global financial crisis. Despite the breadth and depth of the crisis, households were also 
affected by idiosyncratic shocks, as they are at any given time. However, the data available do not 
allow us to separate households affected by idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.  
To analyze human capital investment decisions by households in response to adverse income 
shocks, we adopt a propensity score matching (PSM) technique. We further focus on the health and 
education  investment  decisions  of  households  affected  by  income  shocks.  Although  the  PSM 
technique  has  been  used  extensively  in  the  literature,  it  is  susceptible  to  hidden  bias  due  to 
unobserved  factors.  We  therefore  perform  sensitivity  analyses  using  Mantel-Haenszel  (M-H) 
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3 approach and find that our results are robust and  the influence of unobserved factors is 
insignificant.  
We believe that the paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, the paper 
draws attention to the impact of income shocks on human capital investment decisions, while much 
of the literature has focused on the impact of income shocks on long-term human capital outcomes. 
As such, the paper underscores the need for policy actions to mitigate the impact of income shocks 
and thereby protect long -term and possibly intergenerational household welfare. Sec ond, the 
methodology adopted can be particularly useful during crises when policymakers lack timely 
information about household coping strategies regarding human capital investments. The paper 
establishes the causality between income shocks and human capital investment decisions with only 
a single cross-section of data. Third, by studying data from Eastern Europe, this paper studies a 




We find that households affected by income shocks cope by reducing some human capital 
investments. Interestingly, households are more likely to adopt health-related coping strategies as 
opposed to education-related coping strategies. The results from Armenia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, 
and Turkey show that households affected by income shocks reduce their visits to doctors and 
reduce  their  spending  on  medicine  and  medical  care  significantly  more  than  the  matched 
comparison group. Households affected by income shocks reduce their education investments, but 
did not adopt harmful education-related coping strategies, such as withdraw children from schools 
or move children from costly private to cheaper public schools.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature on the impact of shocks 
and crises on human capital investments. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 describes the 
methodology, including the sensitivity analysis. The penultimate section presents the results from 
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five countries in Eastern Europe where crisis response survey data are available. Finally, Section 6 
summarizes the main findings and concludes.  
 
2 Literature on the impact of income shocks on human capital investments  
 
One of the most common strategies adopted by households to cope with income shocks is to reduce 
household expenditures (Azam, 2010; Chambers, 1989; Fiszbien, Giovahnoli, and Aduriz, 2003; 
World Bank, 2011). These expenditure reductions take many forms: substituting cheaper goods, 
delaying  consumption  of  durable  goods,  reducing  human  capital  investments  by  withdrawing 
children from schools, reducing visits to doctors, or reducing medicine and medical care utilization. 
Some of these coping strategies may lead to lower human capital accumulation and subsequently, 
lower lifetime earnings (see Case, Fertig and Paxon, 2005; Hoddinott et al. 2008; Ferreira and 
Schady,  2008).  The  choice  of  coping  strategies,  however,  vary  extensively  across  households 
depending  on  their  social  and  economic  status  and  location  (Corbett,1988).  Household  human 
capital endowments also play a key role. Lokshin and Yemtsov (2001) find that during 1998-99 
economic crisis in Russia, households with higher human capital choose strategies that included 
increasing home production and moving the place of residence to cope as compared to households 
with lower human capital endowments.  
The  impact  of  income  shocks  on  human  capital  investments,  especially  education,  is 
heterogeneous (UNESCO, 2000; Skoufias, 2003). Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) find that school 
attendance by rural poor children in India decreases as a consequence of adverse income shocks. 
Duryea (1998) for Brazil and Skoufias and Parker (2002) for urban Mexico, both  find similar 
adverse  effects  on  school  attainment
5.
 
Evidence  from  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  the 
Commonwealth of Independent states shows that the economic transition led to a reduction in 
enrollment (Paxon and Schady, 2005).  
However,  Mckenzie  (2003)  finds  that  school  attendance  rates  rose  among  15-18  year  olds 
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during the Mexican crisis. Thomas et al. (2004) observe a similar pattern in Indonesia after the East 
Asian Crisis. They show that poor households reduced education expenditure for younger children 
but protected their education investments for older children. Using survey data from 100 villages 
around Indonesia collected prior to the crisis in May 1997 and then three times after the onset of 
the crisis – in August and December 1998 and May 1999  – Cameron (2000) finds that school 
attendance dropped slightly during the crisis, but rebounded after the crisis to levels higher than 
prior to the crisis. King (2009) shows that per capita education expenditures declined more steadily 
in post-crisis Indonesia while dropout rates did not rise. This, King argues, is because of the sticky 
nature of enrollment, and because parents want to protect past education investments.  
The conflicting findings are explained by aggregate shocks giving rise to opposing income and 
substitution effects. Decreases in income (adverse income  effect) lead households to withdraw 
children from school, on one hand, while decreases in wages or poor labor market  conditions 
during the crisis lowers the opportunity cost of schooling leading households to keep their children 
in school on the other hand. As a result, educational investments depend on whether the income 
effect or the substitution effect dominates.  
Ferreira  and  Schady  (2008)  show  that  the  impact  of  economic  shocks  on  human  capital 
investments and human development outcomes depends on the wealth of the country. They show 
that  in  richer  countries,  child  health  and  education  outcomes  are  counter-cyclical.    In  poorer 
countries, the outcomes are pro-cyclical — where infant mortality rises, and school enrollment and 
nutrition fall during recessions. In middle-income countries, the pattern is mixed – where health 
outcomes are generally pro-cyclical, and education outcomes are generally counter-cyclical. The 
authors suggest that richer countries, with deeper and better-functioning credit markets, are more 
likely to see improvements in both health and education during down-turns. School enrollments 
increase because the substitution effect dominates the income effect for households with greater 
access to credit markets.  
While there is a substantial literature on linking income shocks with education investments, the 
literature on the impact of income shocks on health investments, however, is relatively sparse. The 
majority of studies link income shocks with longer-term health effects, such as, maternal health or 6 
 
nutrition outcomes (Baird et al. 2007; Ferreira and Schady 2008; Paxon and Schady 2005).  
There are, however, a few studies that analyze the link between income shocks and short-term 
health-related coping strategies. For example, Conceição et al. (2009) acknowledge that an income 
shock  reduces  the  household‘s  ability  to  pay  for  maintaining  or  improving  health  generally 
decreases and private spending on food, medicine and health care also decreases. Cutler et al. 
(2002)  find  that  during  the  economic  crisis  in  Mexico,  out-of-pocket  health  expenditures  on 
hospitalization, doctors visit and dental care declined (3.9 to 3.1 percent of GDP) between 1994 
and 1995. The decline was more evident among families with elderly members and that led to 
higher mortality rates in post crisis Mexico. Frankenberg et al. (1999) report a significant decline in 
the  proportion  of  household  incomes  spent  on  health  in  Indonesia.  They  show  that  public 
healthcare  use  declined  sharply  and  the  percentage  of  children  under  five  visiting  community 
primary health care centers fell by half.  
3 Data  
This  paper  analyzes  data  from  five  Crisis  Response  Surveys  (CRS)  conducted  in  Armenia, 
Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania, and Turkey. All the surveys were conducted between mid-2009 
and early-2010. These CRSs are shorter versions of regular household surveys (such as Living 
Standards  Measurement  Surveys)  but  special  modules  focus  on  income  shocks  and  coping 
strategies. Although the survey contains information on whether incomes rose, fell or stayed the 
same, a key drawback of the surveys is that they have no measure of the intensity of the effect on 
any of the income components.
6 CRS for four countries were launched in rural and urban locations, 
but the Turkey CRS only surveyed urban households.  
Households affected by income shocks are those  households that report that any one of the 
following applies within the recall period (6 -12 months): (i) wage rates of any working age 
individual in the household falls; (ii) working hours of any working age individual in the household 
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falls; (iii) any employed member of the household loses his/her job; and (iv) remittances into the 
household falls.  
Based on the above criteria, we divide households (see Table 1) into two groups—―affected‖ 
and ―not affected.‖ In 2009, 32 percent of households in Armenia, 26 percent of households in 
Bulgaria, 20 percent of households in Montenegro, 17 percent of households in Romania, and 21 
percent  of  households  in  Turkey  report  that  at  least  one  component  of  household  income  fell 
relative to 6 to 12 months earlier (see Table 1). In general, salary reductions outnumber job losses 
(World Bank, 2011). For example, six percent of sampled households in Turkey report a job loss, 
20 percent report a wage rate reduction, and 7 percent report a reduction in hours of work (see 
Table 2). As discussed earlier, some of the reported income shocks are expected regardless of 
whether or not a crisis occurred, while the rest of the reported income shocks are likely due to the 
crisis.  
Each CRS also contains a detailed module on the strategies adopted by the households to cope 
with  income  shocks.  Although  there  is  variation  in  coping  strategies  adopted,  there  are  also 
commonalities across countries. We focus on some of the more harmful coping strategies that are 
linked directly to human capital investments. In health, we identify households that reduced the 
following relative to 6-12 months earlier: (i) visits to doctors; (ii) medical care expenses; or (iii) 
purchase of regular medications. Similarly, in education, we identify households that adopted the 
following coping strategy relative to 6-12 months earlier: (i) withdrew children from school; (ii) 
moved  children  from  an  expensive  to  cheaper  schools;  or  (iii)  postponed  training  (language 
courses, information technology courses, etc.) in school or college.  
Table  3  presents  the  distribution  of  coping  strategies  in  human  capital  investments.  The 
distribution  of  coping  strategies  demonstrates  some  variation  between  affected  and  unaffected 
households across countries. In Armenia, for example, 43 percent of households cancel visits to 
doctors or health care centers. The incidence is 16 percentage points higher among households that 
report income shocks.  In Montenegro, Romania and Turkey where 16.4, 8.7 and 20.8 percent 
household respectively reduced their regular visits to doctors or use of health services. While in 
some countries the difference between households affected and not affected is substantial (7-8 8 
 
percentage points in Montenegro, 12 percentage points in Turkey), others show no difference. In 
Romania, 23.7 percent of households affected by income shocks and 20.5 percent of households 
not affected by income shocks report reducing visits to doctors.  
Similar patterns are observed with respect to purchase of medicine. In Armenia, 38 percent 
households stopped buying medical care or medicine. Households affected by income shocks are 
12 percentage points more likely to adopt the strategy than households not affected by income 
shocks. In Bulgaria, Montenegro and Turkey the differences between households affected and not 
affected with respect to purchasing medicine are 4, 13 and 10.5 percentage points respectively. In 
Romania, 22.7 percent of households affected by income shocks reduce medicine or medical care 
expenditures  while  20.4  percent  of  households  unaffected  by  income  shocks  adopt  the  same 
strategy.  
Table 3 also shows that households changed their human capital investments in education. In 
Montenegro, 16.2 percent of affected households canceled or postponed their training courses in 
computer or language arts. In Bulgaria, 12.8 percent affected households reduced their education 
expenditure while only 6 percent of unaffected households did the same. Approximately, 7 percent 
more  affected  households  canceled  their  children‘s  extracurricular  school  activities  than  the 
unaffected households.  
While the incidence of coping strategies differ across countries and sometimes look substantial 
between affected and unaffected household, causality can only be attributed with further empirical 
analysis.  Moreover,  there  are  other  factors  that  can  lead  to  unreliable  results.  For  example, 
households that report that they are not  affected by income shocks  constitute a heterogeneous 
group  with  diverse  vulnerability  to  the  same  economic  shock.  Therefore,  simple  group  mean 
difference will lead to biased results. However, households that report income shocks may have 
more reasons to report adoption of coping strategies. To avoid selection bias, and any influence of 
unobserved factors in motivating households to report more income losses, we adopt a propensity 
score matching technique and sensitivity analysis. The next section describes the method and its 
relevance for this analysis in detail.  9 
 
4 Methodology  
We adopt a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique to isolate the impact of income shocks on 
households‘ human capital investment decisions.  PSM hinges on two identifying assumptions. 
First,  unconfoundedness  or  conditional  independence  has  to  be  satisfied,  i.e., 
            (Rosenbaum  and  Rubin,  1983;  Lechner,  1999).    Where,           refer  to  outcome 
variables for treated and comparison groups while         refer to the treatment and vector of 
observed covariates respectively. Second, an area of common support must be sufficiently large for 
matching and  .  
When both assumptions are satisfied, conditional on observed household characteristics, the 
average impact (ATT) can be calculated as follows:  
ATT=E(Y1 – Y0|D=1) = E(Y1|D=1) – E(Y0|D=1) 
Where,  the  first  component  on  the  right  hand  side  is  the  expected  value  of  the  outcome  for 
households  affected  by  an  income  shock  (treated);  and  the  second  component  is  the  expected 
outcome  for  the  matched  comparison  (or  counterfactual)  group.  The  average  treatment  effect 
(ATT)  provides  an  unbiased  comparison  of  mean  outcomes  between  households  affected  by 
income  shocks  and  households  that  are  not  affected  by  income  shocks  but  are  similar  in 
vulnerability to the affected households.  We use Kernel matching for our analysis. 
The included covariates, which satisfy the assumptions above, require that covariates: (i) are 
not affected by income shocks; (ii) are time invariant; and (iii) are derived from the same source 
and same environment (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Heckman et al., 1999).  We include the 
following covariates to predict a household‘s propensity to be affected: demography, education 
attainment, ethnicity, religion, native language, location (settlement type), and household‘s asset 
index.  The specification chosen is based on past works, but the following is a brief description of 
the expected impacts of the variables.  First, the proportion of family members in different age 
groups  is  used  to  control  for  cohort  specific  vulnerability  to  income  shocks.  For  example,  a 
majority of people over 64 years are pensioners and hence, the risk of income shocks is likely 
much lower than if they were working age adults.  Second, educational attainment  is included 
  1 | 1 Pr 0     x X D ob10 
 
because income shocks may pose a unique challenge to particular skill groups.  Past work has 
found, for example, that recessions diminish labor market prospects of less-qualified youth and 
greatly  increase  their  vulnerability  to  long-term  unemployment  (World  Bank,  2006,  World 
Development Report, 2007). Third, household head‘s ethnicity and religion, and the location of the 
home are included.  Although these factors may affect job prospects and hence, household income, 
ex-ante,  we  are  not  certain  about  the  correlation  between  these  household  characteristics  and 
income shocks.  De Wall (1990), however, suggests that different religious and ethnic backgrounds 
lead households to react differently during crises. The covariates are balanced to test the hypothesis 
that ‗covariates are jointly insignificant‘. Table 5 presents the results for this hypothesis test.   
Selection of an appropriate model is equally important for good matching.  Since we have a 
binary treatment (meaning households are either affected or not affected by income shocks), we 
chose a probit model of the following form: 
                              
   
                     
where,  xi  represents  demographic  characteristics  of  the  household,  i;  zi  represents  educational 
attainment; wi is a dummy variable for ethnicity; mi is a dummy variable for religion; and di is a 
location dummy. Table 4 reports the contribution of these covariates to a household‘s predicted 
vulnerability to income fluctuations.  The key question to be answered here is whether households 
affected by income shocks respond differently to households not affected by income shocks.  The 
predicted value or the propensity score derived from this model converts the multidimensional 
relation to single dimension and makes it easier to select the similar households in the comparison 
group.  Based on propensity scores, Figure 1 presents the area of common support for each country 
and provides evidence that the criterion on sufficient common support for PSM is satisfied.   
4.1 Sensitivity analysis  
The semi-parametric approach employed in this paper eliminates potential bias from observable 
variables.  However, this approach is not robust to hidden bias from unobserved variables which 11 
 
can be correlated with treatment and outcome variables (Rosenbaum, 2002; Becker and Caliendo, 
2007; DiPrete and Gangl, 2004).  
We  address  this  problem  with  the  bounding  approach,  proposed  by  Rosenbaum  (2002).  
Rosenbaum  bounds  provide  evidence  of  the  degree  to  which  any  results  are  influenced  by 
unobserved  variables.    The  bounding  approach  is  useful  to  indicate  whether  inferences  about 
treatment effects are sensitive to unobserved factors (Baker and Caliendo, 2007).  Because our 
outcome  variables  are  binary  by  nature  (human  capital  investment  coping  strategies  adopted: 
yes=1; no=0), Rosenbaum bounds are computed using the Mantel and Haenszel statistics for binary 
outcomes  (Aakvik,  2001).  Here, the null hypothesis  is  that income shocks  have no effect  on 
coping strategies adopted by households.  The test, therefore, helps to compare households that 
report being affected by income shocks with households that are equally likely to be affected by 
income shocks, but do not report that they are ―affected‖. See Appendix for more details on this 
method.  
We expect a positive (unobserved) selection bias, meaning that those households most likely to 
report being affected are also the most likely to report adoption of harmful coping strategies. This 
bias may lead to an overestimation of the true treatment effect and therefore, reported test-statistic 





statistics  for  our  sensitivity  analysis.  We  choose  upper  bounds  of  our  results  based  on  the 
significance levels for Γ = 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75 and 2. The Q
+
MH statistic adjusts the MH statistic 
downward for the case of positive (unobserved) selection. 
5 Results  
Figure 1 shows that all five countries have sufficient area of common support to reliably apply the 
propensity score matching technique. Table 5 presents the results from the covariate balancing 
exercise for robust matching based on observable household characteristics. Panel I of the table 
shows the percentage reduction in selection bias after balancing. Panel II shows the null hypothesis 
that— all covariates between the treatment and control group are jointly insignificant— is not 
rejected for all countries except for Bulgaria. The balancing reduces the selection bias significantly 12 
 
for Bulgaria as well but fails to accept the null hypothesis. We however, accept the closest match 
possible without more stringent balancing because observations of households affected by income 
shocks would be lost.  
We find that households affected by income shocks reduce some human capital investments to 
cope  with  the  shock.  Interestingly,  households  are  more  likely  to  adopt  health-related  coping 
strategies as opposed to education-related coping strategies. The results from Armenia, Bulgaria, 
Montenegro, and Turkey show that households affected by income shocks reduce their visits to 
doctors  and  reduce  their  spending  on  medicine  and  medical  care  significantly  more  than  the 
matched  comparison  group.  Households  affected  by  income  shocks  reduce  their  education 
investments,  but  did  not  adopt  harmful  education-related  coping  strategies,  such  as  withdraw 
children from schools or move children from costly private to cheaper public schools.  
 
5.1 Health investments  
Table 6 reports the average treatment effects (on treated) for health investments. To evaluate the 
impact  of  income  shocks  on  health-related  investments,  the  following  indicators  are  studied: 
reducing visits to doctors, reducing spending on medicine and medical care or canceling health or 
life insurance. We find statistically significant differences in the adoption of harmful health-related 
coping strategies between households  affected by  income shocks  and the matched comparison 
group.  The  results  from  Armenia,  Bulgaria,  Montenegro,  and  Turkey  show  that  households 
affected  by  income  shocks  (i)  reduce  their  visits  to  doctors  and  (ii)  reduce  their  spending  on 
medicine and medical care significantly more than the matched comparison group. In Romania, the 
difference between households affected by income shocks and the matched comparison group is 
not significant, albeit the incidence of adoption of these strategies from households affected by 
income shocks and the matched comparison group is high.  
In  Armenia,  households  affected  by  income  shocks  adopt  harmful  health-related  coping 
strategies more often than the matched comparison group. Households affected by income shocks 
are 15 percentage points more likely to reduce visits to doctors and spend 14 percentage points less 
on medicines as compared to households in the matched comparison group. In fact, households 13 
 
affected by income shocks are 16 percentage points more likely to adopt at least one of the above 
coping  strategies  relative  to  the  matched  comparison  group,  and  most  households  adopt  both 
measures.  
In Bulgaria, households affected by income shocks reduce visits to doctors, and reduce medical 
care expenditures significantly as compared to the matched comparison group. At least 24 percent 
of households affected by income shocks reduce visits to doctors as compared to only 9 percent 
from the matched comparison group. In other words, households affected by income shocks are 15 
percentage  points  more  likely  to  reduce  visits  to  doctors  than  the  matched  comparison  group. 
Households affected by income shocks reduce their medical care expenditures by 9 percentage 
points more than the matched comparison group. However there is no statistical difference between 
households affected by income shocks and the matched comparison group on the incidence of 
health insurance cancelation. Affected households are about 21 percentage points more likely to 
adopt at least one harmful coping strategy than the matched comparison group.  
In Montenegro, households affected by income shocks reduce visits to doctors, reduce their 
spending on medical care, and cancel medical/life insurance more often as compared to households 
in the matched comparison group. Households affected by income shocks are 5 percentage points 
more likely to reduce visits to doctors; 15 percent more likely to reduce their spending on medical 
care and 8 percentage points more likely to cancel their medical/life insurance as compared to the 
matched comparison group. In fact, affected households are 15 percentage points more likely to 
adopt  at  least  one  harmful  coping  measure  than  the  matched  comparison  group,  while  most 
households  affected  by  income  shocks  adopt  multiple  health-related  coping  strategies 
simultaneously.  
The pattern of health care usage, however, differs considerably in Romania from the countries 
discussed above. There is no significant difference between households affected by an income 
shock and the matched comparison group, despite a high rate of adoption of health-related coping 
strategies. Among households affected by income shocks, 22 percent reduce or cancel visits to 
doctors as compared to 19 percent from the matched comparison group; and 20 percent reduce 
medicine or medical  care purchases as  compared  to  16 percent  from the matched comparison 14 
 
group. In fact, 25 percent of households affected by income shocks choose at least one of the above 
health-related  coping  strategies.  The  lack  of  variation  between  households  affected  by  income 
shocks  and  households  in  the  matched  comparison  group  underscores  a  general  trend  in  the 
economy, namely to reduce health care usage regardless of whether or not the household suffered 
an income shock. One explanation might be low overall consumer confidence, leading to lower 
health investments.  
In Turkey, households affected by income shocks reduce doctors‘ visits and reduce medical 
care  utilization  significantly  compared  to  households  in  the  matched  comparison  group. 
Households affected by income shocks are 9 percentage points more likely to reduce visits to 
doctors and 9 percentage points more likely to reduce medical care expenditures compared to the 
matched comparison group. Households affected by income shocks are 12 percentage points more 
likely to adopt at least one of the above health-related coping strategies as compared to the matched 
comparison group.  
The above findings are consistent with findings in Frankenberg et al. (1999) for Indonesia, and 
Cutler et al. (2002) for Mexico, where they show that households‘ out of pocket expenditure for 
medical care and medicines, visits to doctors or primary health care facilities declined after the 
crisis. Cutler et al. further argue that these health care usage declines were more prevalent among 
households with elderly people, leading to a higher mortality rate in post crisis Mexico. If such 
short run coping strategies indeed caused an increase in mortality rates, as Cutler et al. argue, then 
our  findings  from  the  five  East  European  countries  can  be  viewed  as  an  early  warning  for  a 
significant deterioration in human development outcomes.  
5.2 Education investments  
Table 7 reports the average treatment effects (on treated) for education investments. In the five 
countries studied here, households affected by income shocks reduce their education investments, 
or adopt education-related coping strategies, but do not adopt harmful education related coping 
strategies.  In  other  words,  the  difference  in  the  adoption  of  harmful  education-related  coping 15 
 
strategies between households affected by income shocks and the matched comparison group is 
statistically  insignificant.  We  define  harmful  education-related  coping  strategies  as  ones  were 
households withdraw children from schools or move children from costly private to cheaper public 
schools. However, households affected by income shocks did adopt some education related coping 
strategies, such as reducing spending on schooling, reducing the share of school spending among 
total expenditures, postponing training (language courses, information technology courses, etc.), or 
postponing admission to school or college.  
In Turkey and Bulgaria, households affected by income shocks reduce their share of education 
expenditures  among  total  household  expenditures  relative  to  the  matched  comparison  group, 
whereas households in Armenia, Montenegro and Romania do not. Households affected by income 
shocks in Montenegro cancel or postpone training or admission to schools or colleges relative to 
households in the matched comparison group. In Romania, households affected by income shocks 
cancel their children‘s extracurricular activities.  
In Armenia, there is no significant difference in education-related coping strategies between 
households affected by an income shock and the matched comparison group. Table 7 shows that 
the incidence of households withdrawing children from regular schools or postponing training is 
less than 1 percent (insignificant) between households affected by income shocks and the matched 
comparison group.  
In  Bulgaria,  households  affected  by  income  shocks  reduce  education  spending,  but  do  not 
withdraw children from regular schools, nor do they cancel training relative to households in the 
matched comparison group. Affected households are 15 percentage points more likely to reduce 
education  spending  than  the  matched  comparison  group.  However,  the  difference  between 
households  affected  by  income  shocks  and  the  matched  comparison  group  with  respect  to 
withdrawing children from schools or canceling training is insignificant.  
In Montenegro, the difference between households affected by income shocks and the matched 
comparison  group  is  insignificant  with  respect  to:  (i)  withdrawing  students  from  school;  (ii) 
moving children from expensive to cheaper schools; and (iii) reducing education expenditures. 
However, households affected by income shocks are more likely to postpone training or admission 16 
 
to schools or college relative to the matched comparison group. Households affected by income 
shocks are 10 percentage points more likely to postpone training than the matched comparison 
group. Despite the low incidence of adopting an education-related coping strategy in Montenegro, 
households affected by income shocks are 11 percentage points more likely to adopt at least one 
education-related coping strategy than the matched comparison group.  
In Romania, households affected by income shocks are 6 percentage points more likely to 
withdraw  their  children  from  extracurricular  activities  than  the  matched  comparison  group. 
Unfortunately, no other education-related coping strategies are measured in the survey.  
In Turkey, relative to the control group, households affected by income shocks generally keep 
their children in school and do not postpone training, but they do move children from expensive to 
relatively cheaper schools and reduce educational expenditures. Households affected by income 
shocks are 2 percentage points more likely to move their children from expensive to relatively 
cheaper schools and 5 percentage points more likely to reduce average education expenditures than 
the matched comparison group. However, the incidence of children being withdrawn from schools 
or people postponing training is not significantly different between households affected by income 
shocks and the matched comparison group.  
Our findings for Bulgaria and Turkey are consistent with the views of Thomas et al. (2004) and 
King (2009) that households reduce education expenditures more steadily in post-crisis period. We 
also  find  that  households  postponed  training  in  Montenegro  and  reduced  participation  in  ex-
tracurricular activities in Romania.  
 
5.3 Sensitivity analysis: MH bounds  
Table 8 and 9 reports the MH bound test results for health and education variables respectively. We 
calibrate the MH bound test for different values of Γ between 1 and 2 with an increment of 0.25. 
When Γ=1 there is no hidden bias, while higher values of Γ indicates more influence of unobserved 
factors. Because it is possible that households that report being affected by income shocks are more 
likely to report adopting coping strategies, a downward adjustment in  the upper bound for all 




MH provides the upper bound with corresponding level of significance p
+
mh. 
The sensitivity analysis suggests that the results are robust for all health-related coping 
strategies and are insensitive to unobserved factors even for a high value of Γ <=1.75 for most 
countries. The average treatment effects hold for Γ <=1.5 for Armenia and Γ <=2 for Bulgaria 
indicating insensitivity to a bias that would almost double the odds of exposure to the income 
shocks.  For  Romania,  our  results  hold  while  Γ  <=1.5  but  become  significantly  different 
between affected households and the matched comparison group when Γ >1.5. In Montenegro, 
the  results  are  mixed.  The  treatment  effects  of  canceling  life  insurance  is  insensitive  to 
unobserved factors when Γ <=2, of reducing expenditures on medical care or medicine when Γ 
<=1.75, while the treatment effect of reducing visits to doctors is highly sensitive even for 
Γ=1.25. The sensitivity analysis for Turkey shows that the results are sensitive to unobserved 
factors and a significant amount of hidden bias can dilute the results even for a low value of Γ 
=1.25.  The  sensitivity  analysis  for  education-related  coping  strategies  also  shows  no 
significant influence of unobserved factors. In Armenia, Bulgaria and Montenegro, the results 
hold and do not alter for Γ <=2, indicating insensitivity to a bias that would double the odds of 
exposure to the income shocks. For Romania, the average treatment effects become sensitive 
to hidden bias at Γ=1.5 while in Turkey the treatment effects are mostly insensitive to a bias 
that would double the odds of exposure to the income shocks, except for moving children to 
less expensive schools. The significant difference between the affected households and the 
matched comparison group starts fading at Γ=1.5.  
 
 
6 Conclusions  
When  income  shocks  affect  households  adversely,  households  cope  by  drawing  on  savings, 
increasing family labor supply, accessing formal or informal safety nets, and reducing household 
expenditures and investments. This paper adopts a propensity score matching technique to study 
whether households affected by income shocks cope by reducing human capital investments. The 18 
 
analysis is conducted using five Crisis Response Surveys from Armenia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, 
Romania, and Turkey.  
Findings from the 5 countries reveal that households reduce some human capital investments to 
cope with  income shocks.  In fact,  sampled households  are more likely  to  adopt  health-related 
coping strategies as more often than education-related coping strategies. The results from Armenia, 
Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Turkey show that households affected by income shocks (i) reduce 
visits to doctors and (ii) reduce spending on medicine and medical care significantly more than the 
matched comparison group. Households affected by income shocks reduce education investments, 
but do not adopt harmful education-related coping strategies, such as withdrawing children from 
schools or moving children from costly private to cheaper public schools.  
We interpret the evidence that households adopt health related coping strategies over education 
related coping strategies as evidence that parents tend to protect education investments because 
out-of-pocket  expenses  for  education  are  low  in  all  five  countries  studied  here  and  because 
disrupting education even temporarily can be difficult to reverse.  King (2009) argues that school 
enrollments are generally sticky in the short run because parents are reluctant to pull their children 
out  of school  in  the middle of an  academic  year.   Thomas  et  al.  (2004) find that  households 
affected  by  income  shocks  in  Indonesia  protected  education  investments  of  older  children, 
sometimes at the expense of the younger children in the household.  In addition, households may 
perceive a shock to be temporary and hence, may be reluctant to impact their child‘s long term 
human capital accumulation by withdrawing the child from school. 
On the other hand, utilization of health services, even in countries that provide ―free‖ services, 
usually has some out-of-pocket expenses associated with the utilization.  Frankenberg et al. (1999) 
and Cutler et al. (2002) also find that households affected by income shocks reduced health care 
utilization  in  Indonesia  and  Mexico  during  crises  because  of  the  out-of-pocket  expenses.  
Furthermore, missing a health care appointment or missing a few doses of  medicines may not 
always lead to bad health outcomes. 
Implicit in our analysis in this paper is that households maximize long term welfare prior to the 
income  shock  and  therefore,  any  reductions  in  human  capital  investments  after  the  shock  are 19 
 
assumed to be welfare reducing.  However, this may not be the case because the income shocks, 
especially aggregate income shocks, may lead to new welfare maximizing equilibria, including 
those with lower human capital accumulation.  Policymakers may then choose to intervene if the 
social welfare of the population can be increased by providing incentives to increase human capital 
investments. 
These human capital investment decisions can pose long-term effects on households and as 
such, policy makers may find it advantageous to provide households with instruments to mitigate 
the impact of income shocks. For countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, following World 
Bank (2011), we suggest that governments can follow a three pronged strategy. First, strengthen 
automatic stabilizers, such as unemployment insurance and poverty targeted social assistance, to 
ensure  that  programs  are  able  to  respond  to  the  increased  demand  for  safety  nets.  Ensure 
unemployment insurance and social assistance program coverage is sufficiently broad, centralize 
social assistance financing so that local government budget constraints do not impede registering 
needy people for social assistance, and upgrade program administration to improve targeting and 
response times. Second, adjust safety net program parameters to reflect changing household condi-
tions. For example, during natural disasters or economic recessions, safety net parameters can be 
adjusted  to  improve  government  responses;  for  example,  by  lengthening  the  duration  of 
unemployment  insurance  benefit  payouts  or  reducing  the  activation  conditions  associated  with 
social assistance programs when jobs are scarce. Third, activate new safety net programs to fill 
coverage gaps. When existing safety nets cannot respond fully, new programs can be started to 
reach uncovered vulnerable people. Public works, for example, can be an effective labor market 
program during aggregate shocks, especially labor market shocks, because it creates jobs while 
also addressing small-scale infrastructure development goals.  
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Appendix  
Rosenbaum Bound Approach for binary outcome variables 
To find out Rosenbaum bound (2002) for binary outcomes, we use the Mantel and Haenszel 
statistics as suggested by Aakvik (2001). In our paper it tests the null hypothesis that the perceived 
income shock has no effects on the strategies adopted by households to cope with the shock.  The 
test  helps  us  comparing  the  households  reported  ―affected‖  by  the  income  shocks  against 
households who are equally likely, but did not report ―affected‖
7.  To understand the underlying 
argument,  let  us  assume  that  the  probability  that  a  household,  i,  reports  ―affected‖  is      
                           where    are observed characteristics for individual, i. Parameter  is the 
influence of unobserved factor,     in household‘s decision to report affected. the odds that the 
person, i, reports ―affected‖, as compared to person, j, who did not report ―affected‖ will be 
           
           
  
               
               
  
Now, when an almost identical person is identified in the comparison group (claimed ―unaffected‖) 
through balancing observed covariates, i.e.,          , it leads to  the odds ratio to be  
           
           
                  
The above formulation suggests that when the covariates of a person reported ―affected‖ are 
almost similar to a person who is equally likely but did not report ―affected‖, then the odds of the 
person  to  report  ―affected‖  depends  on  the  difference  in  unobserved  factor,              or    the 
parameter,      Now,  with  the  assumption  that  the  unobserved  factor  is  a  binary  variable,  i.e.,  
         where u=1 indicates reporting ―affected‖, then the odds of reporting ―affected‖ will be 
bounded by  
                                                           





           
           
                         
From the above expression,       suggests no hidden bias due to unobserved factors and upper and 
lower bounds are exactly equal to the estimated statistics, Qmh. As this value increases the relative 





.If there is a higher probability of overestimation, i.e., higher odds of reporting ―affected‖ then the 
statistic of interest is Q
+
mh, and the focus is to find out its bound  where the effects of unobserved 
factors on outcomes are altered. The parameter, p
+
mh shows the level of significance for each Q
+
mh  
and based on this p
+
mh  we can find the bounds for treatment effect on each outcomes.  
Aakvik (2001) notes that the Mantel and Haenszel (MH) test can be used to test for no 
treatment effect both within different strata of the sample and as a weighted average between strata. 
Under the null-hypothesis of no treatment effect, the distribution of y is hyper geometric. With N1s 
and N0s as the numbers of treated and non-treated individuals in stratum s, where Ns = N0s + N1s. 
Y1s is the number of successful participants, Y0s is the number of successful non-participants, and Ys 
is  the  number  of  total  successes  in  stratum  s,  the  test-statistic  Qmh  follows  asymptotically  the 
standard normal distribution and is given by: 
     
  
      
 
Where,  
             




   
  
           
                 
  
         
 
 
   
 
As Aakvik (2001) suggests, this statistic is chi-square distributed with 1 d.f. 26 
 
Figure 1: Area of common support between treatment (households affected by income shocks) and 
control group (households not affected by income shocks) across 5 countries 
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Table 1: Distribution of households affected by income shocks 
Country 
Households reported income 
shock 
Households reported no income 
shock  Total no. of 
households surveyed  (%)  (%) 
Armenia  31.7  68.3  3,930 
Bulgaria  26.1  73.9  1,434 
Montenegro  19.8  80.2  1,170 
Romania  17.3  82.7  1,687 
Turkey  20.5  79.5  2,102 




Table 2: Reported transmission channels of income shocks (%)    








reduced  Any 
Labor 
market  Remittances  Any 
Armenia    
     
16.7  18.6  31.7 
Bulgaria  5.00  36.9  22.3  36.9  24.1  2.2  26.1 
Montenegro  3.36  10.18  4.54  15.14  17.2  3.8  19.8 
Romania  4.27  11.64  3.8  17.26  17.3 
 
17.3 
Turkey  6.11  20.21  6.81  27.52  20.4  0.3  20.5 
Source: Based on information collected through Crisis Response Surveys. Armenia did not have individual 
module in the survey. 
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Table 3: Distribution of human development investment decisions by households affected 
and not affected by income shocks 




affected  All 
Armenia  Reduced or stopped visits to healthcare centers   52.2  38.4  42.9 
 
Reduced or stopped buying medical care or medicines  46.3  33.6  37.7 
 
Withdrew or postponed admission to school, college or kindergarten  2.6  0.8  1.5 
   Took one or more children out of school  0.5  0.4  0.4 
Bulgaria  Reduced or postponed buying regular medicines  22.3  18.2  19.4 
 
Postponed or skipped visits to the doctor after falling ill  14  9.8  11 
 
Postponed or skipped visiting the doctor for preventative care  12.1  8.3  9.4 
 
Reduced other types of educational expenditures   12.8  6  7.9 
 
Cancelled health insurance (for self-employment activity)  7.5  2.2  3.7 
 
Stopped paying into pension or social security contributions  7.5  1.8  3.4 
 
Postponed/ withdrew from training course  1.3  1.5  1.5 
 
Postponed/ withdrew a child from preschool or kindergarten  1.6  1.1  1.2 
 
Withdrew from primary or secondary school  0.4  0.5  0.5 
   Postponed/ withdrew from university  0.4  0.1  0.2 
Montenegro  Replaced use of private medical care with public medical care  26.5  13.6  16.4 
 
Reduced visits to doctor for preventive medical care  15.4  6.8  8.7 
 
Left or postponed intended training courses (computers, languages, 
etc)  16.2  6  8.2 
 
Stopped buying regularly prescribed medication  5  4.2  4.4 
 
Cancelled health or pension insurance for self-employment activity   11.5  1.5  3.7 
 
Cancelled  paying life insurance  8.1  1.9  3.3 
 
Withdrew or postponed admission to school, college or kindergarten  4.2  2.3  2.7 
 
Decided to acquire new skills, education or training  5.8  1.3  2.3 
 
Moved from private to public school or kindergarten  3.5  1.1  1.6 
   Moved to a less expensive school or kindergarten  1.9  1.2  1.3 
Romania  Delayed or renounced medical visits  23.7  20.5  21.1 
 
Reduced buying of needed medicines  22.7  20.4  20.8 
 
Renounced the extra-school activities for children  16.4  9.3  10.5 
   Started courses / trainings in order to acquire new skills  9  3.2  4.2 
Turkey  Reduced the use of health services  26.7  16.2  18.7 
 
Reduced visits to the doctor for preventive medical control  27  14.9  17.8 
 
Left courses of language, computer, others.  6.8  1.6  2.9 
 
Withdrew or postponed the admission to school, college or 
kindergarten.  2.9  2.2  2.4 
 
Cancelled health insurance  4.2  1.5  2.1 
 
Transferred children from private to public school  2.4  0.9  1.3 
   Transferred children to cheaper public or private school  1.9  0.7  1 29 
 
Table 4: Determinants of Propensity Scores (probability of being affected by an income shock) 
Probability of being affected by an income shock  Armenia  Bulgaria  Montenegro  Romania  Turkey 
Household size  0.044**  0.048  0.132**  0.219**  0.135** 
Age of the household head  -0.003  0.002  -0.009*  -0.166**  -0.017** 
Gender of the household head  0.066  -0.209*  0.189  -0.05  0.239* 
Proportion of working age population within age 
group 19 and 25years  0.270*  -0.099  0.32  0.591  -0.509** 
Proportion of working age population within age 
group 26 and 60years   0.303**  0.322*  0.379*  -0.413  0.195 
Location dummy (Urban=1)  0.211**  0.145  -0.029  0.197*   
HH asset index  0.005  0.016  -0.006    0.066 
Language spoken at home   
 
    0.038 
Ethnicity:   
   
   
Montenegran    
  0.577*   
Serbian    
  0.589*     
Yugoslavian    
  0.523     
Albanian    
  1.032**     
Bosnian    
  0.457     
Moslems    
  1.148**     
Romanian     0.385  0.121  -0.281   
Croatian    
  0.377     
Other     1.405*  1.38**  -0.388   
Bulgarian   
 
     
Turkish    0.517*       
Religion:   
   
   
Christian     -0.002  -0.752   
Muslim     -0.514*  -0.559     
Roman Catholic    
  -0.62     
No religion    -0.018       
Highest education:  Primary Education  0.486*    -0.04    -0.207 
Secondary Education  0.380**  0.078  -0.035  0.227**  -0.3 
Under graduate  0.340**  -0.168  -0.133  0.017  -0.776** 
Post graduate  0.273**  -0.317*       
Constant term  -1.120***  -0.567  -1.142*  -0.40  -0.599 
Observation  3926  1398  1167  1709  2102 
LR    (11)  99.130  62.24  94.99  172.1  146.98 
p  >    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Log likelihood  -2384.160  -908.020  -505.550  -700.11  -988.81 
Pseudo R
2  0.020  0.033  0.086  0.1095  0.0692 
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Table 5: Balancing covariates  
           Armenia        Bulgaria      Montenegro      Romania    Turkey 
Variable  %  
Reduction in 
|Bias|  p>t 
% 
Reduction 
in |Bias|  p>t 
% 
Reduction 
in |Bias|  p>t 
% 
Reduction 
in |Bias|  p>t 
% 
Reduction 





71.0  0.20 
-13.2  0.03  57.2  0.07  85.6  0.26  88.4  0.446 
Age of the household head  91.2  0.76  45.0  0.00  60.9  0.14  91.8  0.56  71  0.06 
Gender of the household head  98.4  0.96  -5.6  0.34  89.9  0.17  86.8  0.76  100  1.00 
Proportion of working age population within age group   
   
   
19 and 25years  75.4  0.54  22.2  0.00  23.7  0.28  99.1  0.99  84  0.811 
26 and 60years   96.6  0.89  78.3  0.00  45.3  0.03  16.8  0.11  75.3  0.875 
Location dummy (Urban/rural)  68.5  0.28      14.8  0.86  88.5  0.73     
HH asset index  67.9  0.40      57.9  0.14 
   
21.3  0.644 
Highest education attainment           
   
   
Primary  -1434.6  0.23      -388.5  0.69  85.1  0.59  100  1.00 
Secondary  70.1  0.75  3.6  0.55  -13.8  0.68  81.8  0.89  -101.2  0.733 
Tertiary  87.9  0.89  -27.7  0.00  58  0.41 
   
76.6  0.285 
 
Panel II 
Ho:  All covariates are jointly insignificant 
       
   
   
Pseudo R
2  0.001 
 
0.246    0.019    0.010 
 
0.005   
LR     4.850 
 
390.210    14.310    6.890 
 
5.930   
p>     0.938 
 
0.000    0.112    0.736 
 
0.820   
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Table 6:  Average treatment effects:  Health investments across 5 countries 
      Mean Value 
      Country  Coping strategy  Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E.  T-stat 
Armenia  Reduced visits to doctor  0.49  0.34  0.15  0.02  6.36 
 
Reduced spending on medical care or medicine  0.43  0.29  0.14  0.02  6.16 
   Adopted at least one harmful strategy  0.55  0.39  0.16  0.02  6.78 
Bulgaria  Reduced visits to doctor  0.24  0.09  0.15  0.07  2.15 
 
Reduced spending on medical care or medicine  0.11  0.02  0.09  0.04  2.61 
 
Cancelled health insurance  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.19 
   Adopted at least one harmful strategy  0.32  0.11  0.21  0.07  2.91 
Montenegro  Reduced visits to doctor  0.11  0.05  0.05  0.03  1.72 
 
Reduced spending on medical care or medicine  0.26  0.12  0.14  0.05  3.12 
 
Reduced spending on medicine  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.96 
 
Cancelled life insurance  0.08  0.00  0.08  0.02  3.59 
   Adopted at least one harmful strategy  0.31  0.17  0.15  0.05  2.94 
Romania  Reduced visits to doctor  0.22  0.19  0.03  0.03  0.84 
 
Reduced spending on  medical care or medicine  0.20  0.16  0.05  0.03  1.40 
   Adopted at least one harmful strategy  0.27  0.21  0.06  0.04  1.51 
Turkey  Reduced visits to doctor  0.23  0.14  0.09  0.03  3.11 
 
Reduced spending on medical care or medicine  0.26  0.16  0.09  0.03  3.01 
   Adopted at least one harmful strategy  0.35  0.23  0.12  0.03  3.29 
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Table 7:  Average treatment effects: Education investments across 5 countries 
      Mean Value    
Country  Coping strategy  Treated  Controls 
Differenc
e  S.E.  T-stat 
Armenia  Withdrawn children from school  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.55 
 
Postponed training  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  1.16 
   Adopted at least one harmful strategy  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.82 
Bulgaria 
Reduced education spending for 
children  0.22  0.07  0.15  0.03  4.71 
 
Withdrawn children from school  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.49 
 
Postponed training  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.17 
   Adopted at least one harmful strategy  0.23  0.07  0.16  0.03  4.74 
Montenegro  Withdrawn children from school  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.02  1.12 
 
Reduced education spending for 
children  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.40 
 
Moved children to less expensive 
school  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.31 
 
Postponed training  0.15  0.05  0.10  0.03  3.01 
   Adopted at least one harmful strategy  0.18  0.07  0.11  0.04  2.75 
Romania 
Renounced the extra-school activities 
for children  0.15  0.09  0.06  0.03  2.13 
   Adopted at least one harmful strategy  0.15  0.09  0.06  0.03  2.13 
Turkey  Withdrawn children from school  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.49 
 
Reduced education spending for 
children  0.13  0.08  0.05  0.02  2.08 
 
Moved children to les expensive 
school  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.01  1.96 
 
Postponed training  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.94 
   Adopted at least one harmful strategy  0.10  0.07  0.03  0.02  1.55 
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Table 8: Mantel-Haenszel bounds for health investments 
            Gamma ( ) 
Country   Coping strategies 
MH Test 
statistics  1  1.25  1.5  1.75  2 
Armenia  Reduced visit to doctors  Q_mh+  7.18  4.71  2.71  1.02  0.35 
   
p_mh+  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.15  0.36 
 
Reduce spending on of medical care or 
medicine  Q_mh+  6.60  4.20  2.25  0.60  0.73 
   
p_mh+  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.27  0.23 
 
      Adopted any one harmful strategy  Q_mh+  7.65  5.15  3.11  1.39  0.00 
       p_mh+  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.50 
Bulgaria  Reduced visit to doctor  Q_mh+  5.60  4.30  3.26  2.40  1.66 
   
p_mh+  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.05 
 
Reduced spending on medical care or 
medicine  Q_mh+  5.37  4.52  3.86  3.32  2.87 
   
p_mh+  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
Cancelled health insurance  Q_mh+  0.45  -0.02  -0.08  0.23  0.51 
   
p_mh+  0.32  0.51  0.53  0.41  0.31 
 
Adopted at least one harmful strategy  Q_mh+  7.52  6.10  4.96  4.02  3.21 
  
 
p_mh+  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Montenegro  Reduced visit to doctors  Q_mh+  1.79  1.28  0.88  0.54  0.25 
   
p_mh+  0.04  0.10  0.19  0.30  0.40 
 
Reduced spending on medical care or 
medicine   Q_mh+  2.77  2.04  1.44  0.95  0.52 
   
p_mh+  0.00  0.02  0.07  0.17  0.30 
 
Reduced spending on medicine  Q_mh+  0.39  0.08  -0.17  -0.35  -0.18 
   
p_mh+  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.02 
 
 
Cancelled life insurance  Q_mh+  2.92  2.60  2.34  2.15  1.98 
   
p_mh+  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.02 
 
 
Adopted at least one harmful strategy  Q_mh+  2.84  2.05  1.40  0.85  0.39 
      p_mh+  0.00  0.02  0.08  0.19  0.35 
Romania  Reduced visit to doctors  Q_mh+  0.68  0.38  1.40  2.26  3.01 
   
p_mh+  0.25  0.35  0.08  0.01  0.00 
 
     Reduced spending on medical care 
or medicine  Q_mh+  0.99  0.03  1.02  1.86  2.59 
   
p_mh+  0.16  0.49  0.15  0.03  0.00 
 
Adopted at least one harmful strategy  Q_mh+  1.50  0.18  0.74  1.66  2.46 
      p_mh+  0.07  0.43  0.23  0.05  0.01 
Turkey  Reduced visit  t doctor   Q_mh+  2.64  1.46  0.49  0.12  0.83 
   
p_mh+  0.00  0.07  0.31  0.45  0.20 
 
Reduced spending on medical care or 
medicine  Q_mh+  2.75  1.53  0.53  0.12  0.85 
 
  p_mh+  0.00  0.06  0.3  0.45  0.20 
 
Adopted at least one harmful strategy  Q_mh+  2.94  1.57  0.45  0.33  1.15 
      p_mh+  0.00  0.06  0.33  0.37  0.13 
Note: p_mh+ represents level of significance obtained from Mantel-Haenszel bounds test. ―Γ‖ represents odds of differential assignment due to 
unobserved factors. 
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Table 9: Mantel-Haenszel bounds for education investments 
      MH- Test     Gamma ( ) 
Country  Coping Strategies  statistics  1  1.25  1.5  1.75  2 
Armenia                      Withdrawn children from school  Q_mh+ 
         
0.21  -0.12  -0.32  -0.12  0.06 
   
p_mh+ 
         
0.42  0.55  0.63  0.55  0.48 
 
 
Postponed training  Q_mh+  1.34  0.88  0.52  0.21  -0.06 
   
p_mh+  0.09  0.19  0.30  0.42  0.52 
 
            Chosen at least one harmful strategy 
 
Q_mh+  1.00  0.46  0.02  -0.09  0.22 
   p_mh+  0.16  0.32  0.49  0.54  0.41 
Bulgaria  Reduced education cost  Q_mh+  9.63  8.57  7.76  7.10  6.56 
   
p_mh+  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
Withdrawal of students  Q_mh+  0.66  0.42  0.23  0.08  -0.06 
   
p_mh+  0.26  0.34  0.41  0.47  0.52 
 
Postponing training  Q_mh+  -0.19  -0.38  -0.55  -0.56  -0.46 
   
p_mh+  0.57  0.65  0.71  0.71  0.68 
 
 
        Adopted at least one harmful strategy  Q_mh+  9.81  8.73  7.89  7.22  6.66 
      p_mh+  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Montenegro  Withdrawal of students  Q_mh+  0.39  0.08  -0.17  -0.35  -0.18 
   
p_mh+  0.35  0.47  0.57  0.64  0.57 
 
              Moved children to cheaper school  Q_mh+  -0.33  -0.08  0.17  0.39  0.58 
   
p_mh+  0.63  0.53  0.43  0.35  0.28 
 
Postponed training  Q_mh+  3.18  2.63  2.19  1.83  1.52 
   
p_mh+  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.06 
 
Adopted at least one harmful strategy  Q_mh+  2.73  2.12  1.62  1.22  0.87 
  
 
p_mh+  0.00  0.02  0.05  0.11  0.19 
Romania  Withdrawn children from extra-  Q_mh+  2.75  1.73  0.90  0.21  0.17 
 
curricular activities  p_mh+  0.00  0.04  0.18  0.42  0.43 
 
Adopted at least one harmful   Q_mh+  2.75  1.73  0.90  0.21  0.17 
   strategy in education   p_mh+  0.00  0.04  0.18  0.42  0.43 
Turkey  Withdrawn children from school  Q_mh+ 
        




       
0.46     0.48    0.31  0.19  0.11 
 
Moved children to less   Q_mh+ 
       
2.13     1.74   1.45  1.20  1.00 
 
 expensive school  p_mh+  0.02  0.04   0.07  0.11  0.16 
 
 
Postponed training  Q_mh+ 
        
1.51 
         
1.02  0.62  0.29  0.01 
   
p_mh+  0.07  0.15  0.27  0.39  0.50 
 
Adopted at least one harmful   Q_mh+  2.15  1.38  0.76  0.24  -0.08 
   strategy   p_mh+  0.02  0.08  0.22  0.41  0.53 
Note: p_mh+ represents level of significance obtained from Mantel-Haenszel bounds test. ―Γ‖ represents odds of differential assignment due to 
unobserved factors. 